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COMMENTS
THE CHANGING TRANSPORTATION PLANNING PROCESS
WADE PETERSON*
The author reviews the history of the transportation plan-
ning process and assesses the impact of recent federal statutory
requirements for public hearings, relocation assistance, environ-
mental impact statements, preservation of open spaces, and state
action plans on transportation decisionmaking.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
The federal highway and mass transit funding programs grew
from different historical roots. The initial support for a federal high-
way program began around the turn of the century when the "Good
Roads Movement" sought federal funding for the construction of
paved routes from farm to market. Under pressure from this rural
movement, Congress passed the first Federal Aid Highway Act in
1916.1 Over the years Congress often modified the structure of the
original highway program.' However, the most significant develop-
* J.D., M.A. in Urban & Regional Planning, University of Iowa; Member, The Florida
Bar.
1. Act of July 11, 1916, ch. 241, §§ 7, 8, 39 Stat. 355. See also H. MERTINS, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION POLICY IN TRANSITION 509 (1972).
2. In 1921, Congress called upon the states to select a system of paved highways limited
to 7 percent of the total mileage of existing rural roads. Federal Aid Highway Act of 1921,
ch. 119, § 6, 42 Stat. 212. Congressional debate on the 1921 act centered on the importance
of paved roads for farmers. For example, Representative Woodruff stated:
The thing I want to see in this country is the improvement of roads to such an
extent . ..that every farmer .. .shall be able to haul his produce to market
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ment came in 1956 with the passage of two acts3 which initiated
perhaps the greatest public works project since the Great Wall of
China.' The principal feature of these acts was the 21 billion dollar
allocation for the construction of a 41,000 mile National System of
Interstate and Defense Highways.5 To fund this vast project, Con-
gress created a Highway Trust Fund from which revenues were dis-
tributed to pay for federal highways.'
Since 1916, when the initial statutes took effect, the develop-
ment of the federal highway program has resulted in four highway
systems. The primary, secondary, and urban systems7 are 70 percent
federally funded, while the interstate system' is 90 percent federally
funded. Each highway system represents a certain category of high-
way. The primary and secondary systems include rural and farm-
to-market routes;9 the interstate system includes major freeways
which connect large population centers;H' and the urban system in-
cludes arterial and collector routes in urban areas." Funding in-
cludes engineering and planning as well as actual construction.'
over the best possible roads at the least possible cost, and that is the only eco-
nomic principle involved in this question before us today. . . . It is a fact that
intercity and interstate motor-truck transportation of merchandise is growing
larger and larger each year, hastened, of course, by the exorbitant freight rates
charged by the railroads, and this situation should be given consideration. It is
not, nor can it ever become, of primary importance, for the reason that more
tonnage is hauled over our country roads, over our waterways, or by truck, from
it to city or from state to state combined.
61 CONG. REc. 3093 (1921).
Under the President's wartime emergency powers, Congress passed in 1941 the Defense
Highway Act. Act of Nov. 19, 1941, ch. 474, § 4, 55 Stat. 765. Funds were appropriated for
roads constituting lines of a military strategic network of highways. For a discussion of how
World War II caused increased control of national transportation policy, see MERTINS, supra
note 1, at 40-41. For a presentation of the national transportation system as related to defense,
see J. WHITE, TRANSPORTATION AND NATIONAL DEFENSE (1941).
3. The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, 70 Stat. 374, and
The Highway Revenue Act of 1956, Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, 70 Stat. 387.
4. Note, A Cure for the Highway Epidemic: A Balanced Subsidy, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
902, 908 (1971). See Sevilla, Asphalt Through the Model Cities: A Study of Highways and
the Urban Poor, 49 J. URBAN LAw 297 (1971).
5. Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, 70 Stat. 374, § 108(k)(1). This interstate system was to
be built under standards set by the Secretary for projected highway needs of 1975. 23 U.S.C.
§ 109 (1970). By 1958, 34,620 miles were proposed in rural areas, and 4,603were urban. Levin,
Federal Aspects of the Interstate Highway Program, 38 NEB. L. REV. 377 (1957).
6. Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, § 209, 70 Stat. 387. For further discussion of the 1956
acts, see Levin, supra note 5.
7. 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
8. Id. § 120(a)-(c).
9. Id. § 103(b)-(c).
10. Id. § 103(c)(1).
11. Id. § 103(d).
12. Id. § 120(h)-121(a).
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The program is administered through a cooperative arrangement
between the states and the federal government. State highway de-
partments work with federal officials to design and construct high-
ways which meet federal standards. 3
Unlike the situation with long-standing highway programs, fed-
eral participation in mass transit did not begin until 1961.1 In that
year, as a result of threats by several key commuter railroads to
discontinue service to major metropolitan areas, 5 Congress granted
limited aid to mass transit. The basic structure of the present mass
transit program was created under the Urban Mass Transportation
Act of 1964.11 Funds were originally provided for demonstration pro-
jects and capital improvements including the purchase of land,
buses and rolling stock. 7 By 1966 the use of funds was extended to
subsidize studies in management training, planning, and engineer-
ing. 8 Federal finances presently cover 80 percent of transit construc-
tion costs and 50 percent of operating costs."9
13. Id. § 109. The organization of federal transportation programs was altered in 1966
when the Department of Transportation was established. The Secretary of Transportation
was given broad duties including gathering, analyzing, and disseminating technological,
statistical, and economic information as well as coordinating a national transportation policy.
Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, §§ 2(a), 4(a), 7(a), 80 Stat. 931, 933, 941-42. The
Federal Highway Administration, Federal Railroad Administration and Federal Aviation
Administration were subsumed by the new department. Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. 89-670,
§ 3(c), 80 Stat. 931-32. Subsequently, the Urban Mass Transit Administration was estab-
lished within the Department of Transportation. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1968, § 3(a),
82 Stat. 1369. For an excellent, general discussion of the Department of Transportation, see
G. DAVIS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (1970).
14. Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, tit. I, § 101, 75 Stat. 149. For a thorough
analysis of how the legislation came about, see Smerck, Development of Federal Urban Mass
Transportation Policy, 47 IND. L. J. 249, 254-69 (1972). The mass transit industry in the
United States has its roots in the early 1800's. In 1827, Abraham Bower operated a horse-
drawn carriage on Broadway in New York City. Later in the 19th century, cable lines and
electric motors were used on mass transit lines. In the early part of the 20th century, passen-
ger volume increased, but the Depression did substantial harm to the industry.
15. Among the commuter services in the New York metropolitan area which threatened
to discontinue services were the New York Central Railroad, the Erie Railroad, and the
Lehigh Valley and Delaware, Lackawanna, & Western Railroads. Smerck, supra note 14, at
255-60.
16. Act of July 9, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-365, § § 1 et seq., 78 Stat. 302. See Smerck, supra
note 14, at 275.
17. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-453, § 2(2), 84 Stat. 962, as amended, Act of
Nov. 24, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, §§ 102 (1-3), 104, 106, 88 Stat. 1566, 1571-73.
18. Act of Sept. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-562, § 2(a)(2), 80 Stat. 715, as amended, Act of
Aug. 13, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, tit. I1, § 301(d), 87 Stat. 295.
19. Act of Nov. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-503 § 5(e), 88 Stat. 1568. The development of
the mass transit program resulted from several statutory amendments. Mass transit funding
has traditionally been inadeqaute. The 1964 act did not appropriate adequate funds for
capital improvements. Furthermore, no provision was made for funding operating expenses
or for engineering and planning studies. The calibre of transit management was also quite
poor. Smerck, supra note 14, at 277-78. The 1966 amendment to the 1964 act increased
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Although the federal mass transit and highway programs have
developed through different legislative enactments, both programs
are similarly designed to satisfy the transportation demand of our
urban centers. The framework for meeting this demand is complex.
Automobiles, buses, trains, and trucks all contribute to the trans-
portation of people and goods.20 Citizens travel for purposes of
working, studying, shopping, and socializing.2' When workers com-
mute to and from central business districts during rush hours, high-
way and transit facilities become especially congested. Mass
transit travelers are often inconvenienced by noisy uncomfortable
stations. Drivers breathe air polluted by noxious automobile emis-
sions. 3 In addition, transportation facilities are geared towards the
white middle class.24 Crowded in overpopulated urban centers, poor
black residents do not receive equal transportation service. 5
In this framework, transportation planners must choose be-
tween alternative investment proposals which have far-reaching ef-
expenditures for capital improvements, and provided for demonstration grants. Act of Oct.
15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-453, § 13(b), 84 Stat. 969, amending Act of July 9, 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-365, § 6, 78 Stat. 305. Under the 1966 amendment, 1.5 million dollars per year was
appropriated for management training to states and local governments and 3 million dollars
to higher learning institutions for comprehensive research on urban transport problems. See
statutory authority cited note 18 supra. Despite this federal assistance, the mass transit
industry continued to deteriorate. From 1960-70, all modes of public transit showed revenue
decline. United States Department of Transportation, 1972 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
REPORT 80, Table 111-24 (1972). Additional funds were drastically needed. One of the pur-
poses of the National Mass Transit Assistance Act of 1974 was to meet this economic need.
The act provided 10.9 billion dollars for mass transit expenditures. Act of Nov. 26, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-503, 88 Stat. 1565.
20. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING 145-46 (4th ed. W. Goodman & E.
Freund eds. 1968).
21. J. DE SALvIo, PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 348-50 (1973).
22. TRANSPORTATION REPORT, supra note 19; H. LEAVITT, SUPERHIGHWAYS - SUPERHOAX 5
(1970). Highways tempt people who have used public transit to go to the automobile. In an
attempt to stop congestion, highway builders construct highways which only expand the
problem. Immediately after expressways open, they are crowded. Davis & Farris, The Trans-
portation Paradox and the Federal Research Development Function, 39 I.C.C. PRACT. J. 513
(1972); L. MUMFORD, THE HIGHWAY AND THE CITY 238 (1963); Grubb, Urban Transportation
Alternatives to the Automobile, 39 I.C.C. PRACT. J. 19, 20 (1971); Salaman, Towards Bal-
anced Urban Transportation: Reform of the State Highway Trust Funds, 4 URaAN LAW. 77
(1972); Smerck, supra note 14, at 250; Note, supra note 4, at 902.906.
23. See L. FITCH, URBAN TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1964); Schneiderman &
Cohn, Hazards to Health and Property, 20 CATH. U. AM. L. REV. 5, 5-6 (1970). These emissions
are harmful to health, affecting hearing, mathematic reasoning, athletic performance, and
sight. In sufficient quantity, the emissions may harm the cardio-vascular and central nervous
systems. Id. at 6. For an analysis of these harmful effects, and a discussion of the failure of
highway planners to adequately consider the results of pollution, see id. at 5-18.
24. See Sevilla, supra, note 4 at 299.
25. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS REPORT, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY,
H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 50-52 (1968). See Sevilla, supra note 4, at 299.
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fects upon the lifestyles of urban residents. In making these choices,
planners must comply with several federal statutory provisions."
Perhaps the most important of these provisions conditioned federal
funding upon a transportation planning process." In addition, Con-
gress has passed several provisions which have helped to move
transportation decisionmaking toward a broader, more democratic
process." The purpose of this paper is to clarify the meaning of the
transportation planning process condition, and to demonstrate
some of the ways in which recent federal legislation has contributed
to changing transportation decisionmaking. Particular emphasis
will be placed upon how local citizens have affected this decision-
making process by seeking to halt transportation construction. The
paper will be separated into several parts. First, the requirement of
standing and the scope of judicial review will be summarized. Next,
the application and meaning of the transportation planning process
requirement of the federal highway and mass transit acts will be
clarified. The federal statutory requirements for public hearings,
relocation assistance, drafting of environmental impact statements,
preservation of open spaces, and state action plans will be dis-
cussed. Finally, the effect of these and other statutory provisions
upon the highway and mass transit decisionmaking process will be
analyzed.
11. THE PREREQUISITE OF STANDING AND THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
A. Standing: The Parties to the Law Suit
Federal highway and mass transit construction has adversely
affected many citizens. These citizens have sometimes sued the
Secretary of Transportation in order to halt such construction.
When building a particular highway project as part of a previously
adopted transportation program, the Secretary must follow certain
federal provisions. Citizens seeking to halt transportation construc-
tion often allege noncompliance with these provisions.29
The motives behind these citizen suits are diverse. Some citi-
zens want to stop bulldozers from leveling their homes or local
parks;30 others want to stop any construction which may be harmful
26. See Section IV infra.
27. 23 U.S.C. § 134(a) (1970).
28. Engelen & Stuart, New Directions in Urban Transportation Planning, PLANNING
ADVISORY SERVICE, Dept. No. 303 at 3-4 (1974).
29.See Section IV infra.
30. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
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to the environment." Regardless of the motive, a plaintiff seeking
to enjoin construction of a public project must have proper stand-
ing.
The question of standing concerns whether a party has suffi-
cient stake in a controversy to obtain judicial relief.:2 The United
States Supreme Court recently clarified the test for standing in
environmental suits in Sierra Club v. Morton.:3 In that case a non-
profit environmental association sought to halt the commercial de-
velopment of a remote forest section nestled in the Sierra Nevada
mountains. After examining past decisions, the Court adopted a two
part standing test. First, plaintiffs seeking to enjoin federal agency
action must allege that the action caused them "injury in fact."
Second, the plaintiffs must state that the injury concerned an inter-
est "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated" by the statute allegedly violated. 4 Once this standing test is
met, plaintiffs can assert their particular injuries as well as the
injury to the public in general. The Court held that the Sierra Club
lacked standing to sue because the club failed to allege that any
particular members of the club suffered an injury in fact. Merely by
alleging that Club members actually hiked in this remote mountain
region, the Court noted, would have established proper standing.'
This standing test has been applied in highway cases as well.
For instance, in City of Davis v. Coleman," state officials wanted
to use federal funds to provide a highway interchange near a
planned industrial park. The city, whose land was adjacent to this
park, claimed a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act
due to a failure to prepare an environmental impact statement
(EIS). The complaint also provided that the proposed project could
cause contamination by industrial wastes that might adversely af-
(taking parkland); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972) (taking parkland); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1114
(9th Cir. 1971) (taking homes); Concerned Citizens for Preservation of Clarksville v. Volpe,
455 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1971) (taking homes); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1342
(C.D. Cal, 1972), af'd, 506 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975) (taking
homes).
31. See Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd,
508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd on remand, 531 F.2d 637 (2d
Cir. 1976); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972), modified,
484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973).
32. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
33. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
34. Id. at 733, citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
35. Id. at 739-40.
36. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
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fect the quality and quantity of city water. Citing Sierra Club, the
Davis court concluded that the plaintiff had proper standing even
though the injury was speculative.37 The court reasoned that the
procedural injury implicit in agency failure to prepare an EIS - the
creation of a risk that serious environmental impacts will be over-
looked - is itself a sufficient "injury in fact" to support standing.
There must, however, be a geographic nexus between the site of the
challenged project and the alleged injury which the plaintiff expects
to suffer.
In La Raza Unida v. Volpe,3" the court held that plaintiffs did
not need to own land adjacent to a park in order to prevent the
construction of a highway through it. Instead, plaintiffs had merely
to allege a use of the park.3" Similarly, in Pennsylvania Environmen-
tal Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,4" the court resolved that a conservation
council whose members enjoyed the land and creek waters of a park
had standing to enjoin the construction of a highway through the
park.4
Cases such as Sierra Club, Davis, La Raza and Bartlett illus-
trate the meaning of the standing requirement for highway or mass
transit litigants. The standing test of "injury in fact" is not difficult
to meet. Residents whose homes are displaced by transportation
construction can always show such injury.4" Individuals or environ-
mental associaions whose members enjoy parkland affected by
transportation construction can also show proper standing. 3 Conse-
quently, the constitutional prerequisite of standing is generally a
small hurdle for the litigant.
B. Judicial Review: Questioning Agency Decisionmaking
Judicial review of administrative decisions has been limited."
It is generally felt that separation of powers placed executive and
37. Id. at 671.
38. 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971), af/'d, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 968 (1974).
39. Id. at 232.
40. 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970), aft'd, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971).
41. Id. at 245.
42. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens for the Preservation of Clarksville v. Volpe, 445 F.2d
486 (5th Cir. 1971); Lewis v. Brinegar, 372 F. Supp. 424 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
43. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
44. See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
58-60 (1965); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 643 (1967); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to
Agency Discretion", 82 H~Av. L. REV. 367 (1968); Comment, Administrative Law - Scope of
Judicial Review - Separation of Powers, 50 IOWA L. REV. 865 (1965).
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legislative policy decisions beyond the scope of judicial review.'
State courts generally intervene in agency decisions only when the
acts of state highway departments are arbitrary or an abuse of dis-
cretion. Since state highway legislation generally grants broad dis-
cretion to the highway department,47 plaintiffs bringing suit against
state highway departments for failure to comply with federal condi-
tions have often been unsuccessful. The state courts reason that
compliance with federal requirements is only a condition precedent
to federal funding and that those requirements are not meant to
limit the powers of the state highway departments.4" For example,
in Mornings ide-Lennox Park Association v. State Highway
Department,5" the plaintiffs tried to block the construction of an
interstate highway on the grounds that the transportation planning
process condition had not been fulfilled. The court reasoned that
once federal funds were granted, a state court would not determine
whether such funding complied with federal conditions.5 As demon-
45. See Eberlein v. United States, 257 U.S. 82, 84 (1921); Keim v. United States, 177
U.S. 290, 293 (1900); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840); K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.04 (1958). But see id., §§ 28.05-.07.
46. St. Clair County v. Town of Riverside, 272 Ala. 294, 300, 128 So.2d 333, 338 (1961);
State Highway Dep't v. McDonald, 221 Ga. 312, 317, 144 S.E.2d 363, 367 (1965); State
Highway Dep't v. Strickland, 213 Ga. 785, 787, 102 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1958); Levy v. State Highway
Comm'n, 171 N.W.2d 530, 533 (Iowa 1969); Harvey v. State Highway Comm'n, 256 Iowa 1229,
1231, 130 N.W. 2d 725, 727 (1964); A. & S., Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 253 Iowa 1377,
1385, 116 N.W.2d 496, 501 (1962).
47. E.g., the Iowa Code states that the State Highway Commission shall:
Devise and adopt standard plans of highway construction and maintenance, and
furnish the same to the counties . . . .Construct, reconstruct, improve and main-
tain state institutional roads and state park roads. . . .Prepare, adopt and cause
to be published a long-range program for the primary road system ...
IOWA CODE ANN. § 307.A.2(1), (12), (13) (Supp. 1976).
The Wyoming Code states:
The highway authorities of the state, counties, cities, towns, and villages, acting
alone or in cooperation with each other . . . are hereby authorized to plan, desig-
nate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and provide access
facilities for public use wherever such authority or authorities are of the opinion
that traffic conditions, present or future, will justify such special facilities ....
WYO. STAT. § 24-72 (1967).
48. See, e.g., Morningside-Lennox Park Ass'n, Inc. v. State Highway Dep't, 224 Ga. 344,
346, 161 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1968); State Highway Dep't v. Strickland, 213 Ga. 785, 787, 102
S.E.2d 3, 5 (1958); A. & S., Inc. v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 253 Iowa 1377, 1385, 116
N.W.2d 496, 501 (1962).
49. See Hoffman v. Stevens, 177 F. Supp. 898, 903 (M.D. Pa. 1959); Piekarski v. Smith,
38 Del. Ch. 402, 153 A.2d 587 (1959); Morningside-Lennox Park Ass'n, Inc. v. State Highway
Dep't, 224 Ga. 344, 346, 161 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1968). Linnecke v. Department of Highways,
76 Nev. 26, 31, 348 P.2d 235, 237 (1960); Futch v. Greer, 353 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962).
50. 224 Ga. 344, 161 S.E.2d 859 (1968).
51. Id. at 345-46, 161 S.E.2d at 860-61.
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strated by the Morningside case, state judicial review is narrow in
scope, and does not question the decision of federal highway offi-
cials."2
An analysis of federal judicial review is more enlightening. In
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe13 plaintiffs attempted to
enjoin the construction of a six-lane interstate highway through a
public park. Overton Park established the principle that under the
Administrative Procedure Act, a decision of the Secretary of Trans-
portation is subject to judicial review. Writing for the majority, Mr.
Justice Marshall held that to comply with the federal highway
funding requirements the Secretary's actions must be within the
scope of the Secretary's authority and must not be arbitrary or
discriminatory. 4 However, judges will not question whether federal
agency action is the best, or the better, way to solve a particular
need." Thus, the scope of review limits judicial control over agency
decisions.
Generally, the effect of Overton Park was to restrict highway
litigants to procedural issues. Most complainants who have suc-
ceeded in obtaining judicial relief against the Secretary have
claimed that he failed to file an environmental impact statement,
to adequately protect parkland, or to make some specific finding
that is required of him. If officials follow proper statutory proce-
dures, only clearly arbitrary or unreasonable agency actions will be
set aside.57 Consequently, judicial review in the federal courts is
generally limited to compliance with procedural provisions.
III. THE PLANNING CONDITION OF THE FEDERAL MASS TRANSIT AND
HIGHWAY ACTS
In 1962 Congress enacted the Federal Aid Highway Act which
contained a section referring to transportation planning.5 This
planning section provided that before approval of any program for
52. See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
53. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
54. Id. at 415.
55. Id. at 413-15.
56. See, e.g., Fayetteville Area Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe, 515 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir.
1975); Hopewell Township Citizen's 1-95 Comm. v. Volpe, 482 F.2d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975); Monroe County Conservation Soc'y v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693
(2d Cir. 1972); Citizens to Preserve Foster Park v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1972); D.C.
Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (1971); Concerned Citizens for Preservation of
Clarksville v. Volpe, 445 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1971); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir.
1971).
57. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
58. 23 U.S.C. § 134(a) (1970).
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projects on a federal aid highway system, the Secretary of Transpor-
tation must find that the program was based on a cooperative,
comprehensive, and continuous transportation planning process. 9
Commentators have referred to the planning condition embodied in
this section as the 3c process. "
Under the 1962 Highway Act, this 3c process is not a prerequis-
ite for all federally funded projects, but only for those which pass
through urban areas with more than 50,000 people." Since the
primary, secondary, and interstate systems are predominantly
rural, " the 3c process provision would have only limited application
to these systems. Accordingly, this planning provision applies
mainly to the urban system and the extensions of the interstate,
primary, and secondary systems into urban areas."
In the areas where the 3c process provision applies, the signifi-
cance of complying with this federal requirement can be shown by
examining the procedure through which the federal government
becomes obligated to fund highway projects. 4
First, state highway departments submit a program for projects
to the Federal Highway Administrator," knowing that no program
can be approved unless it complies with the 3c process.6 Next, after
program approval, the state highway department submits detailed
plans and specifications for each project. The Secretary's approval
of this project obligates the federal government to fund this particu-
lar highway project. Thus, the significance of the 3c process condi-
59. Id. Transportation planning is the process through which transportation improve-
ments are conceived, tested, and programmed for future construction. See PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING 137 (4th ed. W. Goodman & E. Freund eds. 1968). Transporta-
tion planning and the methodology used to conceive transportation plans is only one section
of the larger field of urban planning. Other studies typically include population forecasting,
economic studies, and land use studies. For a thorough analysis of the importance of these
studies and how to do them see id. at 51-136 and F. CHAPIN, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 129-
255 (1st ed. 1957). The comprehensive plan is a synthesis of more detailed plans, and may
be defined as:
[Ain official public document adopted by a local government as a policy guide
to decisions about the physical development of the community. It indicates in a
general way how the leaders of the government want the community to develop
in the next twenty or thirty years.
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra, at 349.
60. Sevilla, supra note 4 at 311.
61. 23 U.S.C. § 134(a) (1970).
62. Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 §§ 102(a), 108(a), 70 Stat. 374, 378.
63. 23 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1970).
64. A project is defined as "an undertaking to construct a particular portion of highway
.23 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1970).
65. 23 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1970); 49 C.F.R. § 1.48(b) (1975).
66. 23 U.S.C. § 105(d) (Supp. V, 1975).
67. Id. § 106(a) (1970).
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tion ig that no federal highway project in urban areas can be funded
unless it has complied with the 3c process.
This planning provision applies to mass transit construction as
well as highway building. In the National Mass Transportation As-
sistance Act of 1974, Congress adopted the 3c process as part of the
federal mass transit planning requirements."a Since the 3c process
condition is a planning requirement of both mass transit and high-
way legislation, it is important to analyze the regulations"' which
interpret this section.
These regulations provide that the transportation planning pro-
cess should include several studies. For example, there should be an
analysis of the capacity of the present transportation system as well
as a study of the area's economic and land use patterns. In addition,
there should be an evaluation of alternative investments needed to
meet the area's transportation demands. Finally, a transportation
plan should- be developed which outlines a building program to meet
long and short-term transportation needs.'"
In addition to explaining the elements of the transportation
planning process, these regulations create a new procedure through
which the Secretary determines whether the 3c process has been
fulfilled. This procedure compels the state governor to appoint a
Metropolitan Planning Organization to satisfy the 3c process provi-
sions.7 The Metropolitan Planning Organization formulates a
transportation plan. 2 Each year the Federal Highway Administra-
tor and the Urban Mass Transportation Administrator review the
planning process of each urbanized area for compliance with the
planning provisions.73 Certification by these administrators is con-
clusive evidence of compliance.
These regulations help to clarify the meaning of the 3c process
requirements as well as the procedure for finding compliance. In
addition, an examination of case law interpreting the 3c require-
ment will further clarify the planning process condition.
Although the reported cases concern only highway construc-
tion, the wording of the 3c provisions in both the Mass Transporta-
tion and Highway Acts is identical.74 Thus highway cases are au-
thority for the mass transit program as well.
68. 49 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
69. 23 C.F.R. § 450.100 et seq. (1976).
70. Id. §§ 450.116-20.
71. Id. § 450.106.
72. Id. § 450.112.
73. Id. § 450.122.
74. Compare 23 U.S.C. § 134(a) (1970) with 49 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
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One of the most important cases which interprets the 3c process
condition is D.C. Federation of Civil Associations v. Volpe." The
D.C. Federation case involved federal funding for a bridge which
was part of an interstate highway. Although the bridge wag ap-
proved by a regional planning agency as being consistent with a
sound transportation planning process, a local transportation
agency had not included the bridge as part of the published trans-
portation plan. Since the regional planning agency had jurisdiction
over the entire metropolitan region, while the local agency had juris-
diction only over the district, the lower court held that the regional
planning agency's determination was final.7" On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia reversed and
remanded the case, reasoning that the lower court had not under-
stood the 3c process condition." The appellate court came to three
particularly important conclusions. First, judicial review should not
include a determination of which planning agency takes priority.
This determination should be left to the administrative agency.
Second, the court asserted that the emphasis of the planning condi-
tions was on compliance with a process rather than a transportation
plan.7" Accordingly, the court's decision authorizes compliance with
the 3c process condition when there is no transportation plan, or
when the transportation plan does' not include the federal highway
project in question. Since the formulation of a transportation plan
sometimes takes years, the effect of this holding is to speed highway
construction. Third, the court held that the Secretary must do more
than simply accept a local planning agency's evaluation that a high-
way project was based upon a 3c process. The Secretary must make
an independent determination of compliance with the 3c process.
However, in making this determination the Secretary may consider
the findings of local planning agencies."
Although the D. C. Federation court had clarified the proce-
dures necessary for compliance with the 3c process condition, judi-
cial review had not yet described the type of process which would
fulfill the planning requirement. The United States District Court
for the District of Columbia examined such a process in Movement
Against Destruction v. Volpe." In Destruction, the plaintiff alleged
75. :116 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
76. Id. at 795.
77. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
78. Id. at 1240.
79. Id. For a discussion of this case's treatment of administrative decisions, see 19 WAYNE
I,. H1Ev. 1645 (1973).
80. :161 F. Supp. 1360, 1395-96 (D. Md. 1973), alf'd, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974).
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that the 3c condition had not been fulfilled. In describing the "co-
operative, comprehensive and continuous" planning process, the
Destruction court stated that since 1963, six jurisdictions in the
Baltimore region had "cooperated" in a planning effort. From this
statement it may be inferred that "cooperation" means that local
authorities must take part in the planning process. The court also
noted that in 1967 a transportation plan was adopted. After the
adoption, "continuous" examination and re-evaluation of the ele-
ments of the plan took place. Consequently, it seems that "continu-
ous" signifies that a completed transportation plan must be contin-
ually updated and approved.
In addition to indicating what is meant by the words "continu-
ous" and "cooperative," the Destruction court elaborated upon the
meaning of other planning considerations which should be part of
the 3c process. The court explained that the process should include
consideration of the effects of transportation improvements upon
the urban area's land use plan.' However, the court did not discuss
the importance of this consideration, nor did the court illustrate
how detailed this consideration should be.
The Destruction court also stated that the planning committee
had analyzed the need for the construction of highways as well as
mass transit facilities." Such intermodal analysis was emphasized
by Judge MacKinnon in the minority opinion in D.C. Federation."'
Judge MacKinnon asserted that the Secretary of Transportation
should not pass upon any major highway project in the District of
Columbia without considering the effect of the highway upon the
subway construction program." However, like the majority, the
judge did not suggest that all urban areas must have a published
mass transportation plan, nor that such a plan is required under the
3c process."
In Citizens for Mass Transit Against Freeway v. Brinegar,8 the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona also rejected
a claim that a mass transit plan was necessary to fulfill the 3c
process condition. In this case, mass transit construction for the
Phoenix area had been considered by transportation officials but
rejected as impractical. 7
81. Id. at 1395.
82. Id.
83. 459 F.2d 1231, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
84. Id. at 1261.
85. Id. at 1255.
86. 357 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Ariz. 1973).
87. Id. at 1283.
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Thus, while mass transit is a factor which must be considered
during the planning process for highway construction under the
federal statute, the 3c process condition does not require a mass
transit plan. The converse should also be true. When mass transit
funding is at issue, highways are a factor to be considered, but a
completed highway plan should not be an indispensable require-
ment.
Through cases such as D.C. Federation, Destruction, and
Citizens for Mass Transit, and through the regulations promulgated
by the Department of Transportation, the meaning of the 3c process
provision has been illustrated. Judicial review of the 3c process
condition will not generally question whether a particular agency
action was the best way to meet a transportation need. Instead,
courts will limit review to whether the agency action was based upon
a 3c process. This requires that urban areas maintain a planning
process where state and local officials cooperate to create a transpor-
tation plan which is continually updated and approved. The process
must examine the relationship of highways to mass transit facilities
and the effect of these highway facilities upon local land use plans.
Under the regulations, the state governor must appoint a metro-
politan planning agency, and federal officials must annually review
the urban transportation planning process for compliance with the
3c provision. Finally, approval by the Federal Highway Adminis-
trator and the Urban Mass Transit Administrator of this process
constitutes conclusive evidence of compliance."8
IV. FEDERAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING HIGHWAY AND MASS TRANSIT
DECISIONMAKING
Congress has passed other provisions which affect highway and
mass transit decisionmaking. The provisions require public hear-
ings," drafting of environmental impact statements,' relocation
assistance programs,9 preservation of open spaces, 2 and the imple-
mentation of state action plans. 3 These provisions contributed to
the broadening of the decisionmaking basis of transportation plan-
88. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
89. 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970) (highways); 49 U.S.C. § 1602(d) (1970) (mass transit).
90. The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
91. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4625(c) (1970).
92. Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
93. 23 U.S.C. § 109(h) (1970).
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ning and led to a fuller appreciation of the adverse effect of trans-
portation projects upon our urban areas.94
Planners often viewed these additional provisions with suspi-
cion. Once the 3c process reached the stage of choosing appropriate
routes to meet transportation needs, planners saw these require-
ments as obstacles to the job of highway building. Therefore, they
often did not fully comply with these federal funding conditions.
The cases in this section demonstrate how litigation has helped
force transportation officials to comply with Congressional require-
ments.
A. Public Hearings: The Citizen's Participatory Right
When highways traverse highly populated urban areas many
citizens are affected. Public hearings allow these citizens to voice
criticism about transportation decisions.95 Under both the highway
and mass transit acts, federal finances cannot be appropriated un-
less a public hearing is held. The hearing is not meant to create a
record for agency decisionmaking. The public hearing is
nonadjudicatory and quasi-legislative in nature.97 Thus, citizens
neither have the right to cross-examine transportation officials nor
to force those officials to keep an accurate court-like record. 9 The
purpose of the public hearing is to inform the community of the
proposed project and to elicit its views on the project's design and
route .
Of course, only notified citizens can attend the public hearings
and express opposition to the transportation project. Thus, proper
notice is essential to assure that the purpose of the public hearing
is fulfilled. The question of notice was considered in Ward v.
94. See Engelen & Stuart, New Directions in Urban Transportation Planning, PLANNING
ADVISORY SERVICE, Rept. No. 303, 5-6 (1974).
95. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Monroe
County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972); Lathan v. Volpe,
455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Concerned Citizens Forthe Preservation ofClarksville v. Volpe,
445 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1971); City of Rye v. Schuler, 355 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Keith
v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1974); Ward v.
Ackroyd, 344 F. Supp. 1202 (Md. 1972); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D.
Cal. 1971); Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Environment v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp.
918 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
96. 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970) (highways); 49 U.S.C. § 1602(d) (1970) (mass transit).
97. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971); Ward v. Ack-
royd, 344 F. Supp. 1202, 1220 (Md. 1972); Hinrichs v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 260 Iowa
1115, 152 N.W.2d 248 (1967).
98. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.01 et seq. (1958).
99. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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Ackroyd."' In Ward a proposed interstate highway would have en-
compassed part of two parks in Baltimore. Two weeks before the
hearing notice was published in three local newspapers, the time
and place of the public hearing were stated. Although a-description
of the proposed route was included, no graphic illustration was con-
tained in the notice, and the description did not refer to the parks.
Nevertheless, the court held that the notice was sufficient because
local residents would know that the parks were affected. 10' It is
suggested that the reasoning of the Ward court is overly narrow. In
order to adequately inform the public, the notice should have in-
cluded a graphic illustration as well as a verbal description of the
highway routes and the effect of the projects upon the parks.
Once affected citizens have been properly notified, highway
officials must then be certain that the public hearing is fairly con-
ducted. The public hearing provision requires consideration of the
economic, social, and environmental effects of the project. In addi-
tion, the statute requires the project to be analyzed for consistency
with official plans for the comprehensive development of the urban
area." 2 Although federal regulations exhaustively delineate the
standards required at the public hearing, 03 courts have approached
these standards in a more general way.
The court in Keith v. Volpe'"4 ascertained that in addition to
providing a forum for public protest, officials had the affirmative
duty to provide attending citizens with information about the social
and environmental effects of design alternatives. 105 This affirmative
duty requires officials to present alternative highway proposals. In
Ward v. Ackroyd"" highway officials had considered both a southern
and northern route. However, only the southern route was presented
at the public hearing. Since the social, economic, and environmen-
tal effects of the two routes were different, the court concluded that
affected citizens were not adequately informed.' 7 The Ward court
also stated that highway officials need only present alternatives
which have significantly different environmental and social effects.
This was followed in Swain v. Brinegar, '"I where highway officials
100. 344 F. Supp. 1202 (Md. 1972).
101. Id. at 1217.
102. 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970).
103. 23 C.F.R. §§ 790.1-.11 (1976).
104. 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1974).
105. Id. at 1353.
106. 344 F. Supp. 1202 (Md. 1972).
107. Id. at 1221.




presented only a limited number of alternatives. These alternatives
included upgrading an existing route, constructing a four-lane
limited-access route, and making no highway improvement at all.
Deciding that a good faith effort was made, the Swain court judged
that the federal public hearing condition had been met.'"'
At a public hearing, transportation officials must present the
significant alternatives as well as the effects of alternatives upon the
urban area. One such effect is the impact of the transportation
project upon local land use plans.' 0 In City of Davis v. Coleman"'
the plaintiffs questioned whether this effect was properly presented
at the public hearing. Transportation officials had planned a high-
way interchange which would stimulate and service a future in-
dustrial park. The industrial park was located adjacent to an agri-
cultural area. Although there were hundreds of pages devoted to the
area's land use plan, highway officials did not present this informa-
tion at the public hearing. In addition, these officials did not explain
the effect which the proposed interchange would have upon the local
land use plans. Resolving that the public hearing was improper, the
court stopped further highway construction." 2
The Davis court's analysis is especially significant to urban
planners. Traditionally, transportation decisionmakers did not fully
consider the effect of transportation improvements upon local urban
plans. This is unfortunate, because the transportation system can
substantially alter urban growth and development. For instance,
highways have contributed to changes in the basic economic and
land use structure of our urban areas. The availability of highways
has allowed people to commute back and forth from work and to
transport goods and services more efficiently." 3 Thus, the high-
way system has contributed to suburbanization of population and
industry.'
The suburbanization trend can be illustrated through popula-
tion data. The percentage of the total national population in the
urban fringes grew from 13.9 percent in 1950 to 21.1 percent in 1960
to 26.8 percent in 1970."11 In this suburbanization trend, manufac-
turing, retailing, wholesaling, and services all tended to move
109. Id. at 759.
110. See 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970).
111. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
112. Id. at 682.
113. See Sevilla, supra note 4 at 302.
114. See H. LEAVrr, supra note 22; H. MERTINS, supra note 1, at 61-62.
115. See L. MASOTTI & J. HADDEN, THE URBANIZATION OF THE SUBURBS 56 (1973).
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outside the central city."' Under Davis, transportation planners
must examine the effect of transportation improvements upon
urban land use patterns. The extent to which local officials will be
forced to consider the effect of transportation improvements upon
local land use growth and development has not been fully examined.
However, the Davis decision requires at least some consideration of
this effect upon urban growth."'
The public hearing condition blends into other federal require-
ments as well. Transportation officials must reveal whether any
residents will be displaced by the improvement, as well as how the
improvement will affect public parks and other environmental re-
sources. Highway officials have sometimes been perplexed by the
overlap of these federal provisions. Thus, in City of Rye v.
Schuler, "' transportation officials apparently confused the require-
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act with the public
hearing requirements. At the public hearing, the transportation offi-
cials presented only the environmental impact statement. Several
other documents which supported the highway decision were not
presented. The social and economic effects of the proposed highway
were not fully delineated. Thus, the public hearing condition was
not fulfilled." '
A public hearing assures that residents will better understand
how transportation projects affect them. Highway officials have an
affirmative duty to inform fully persons attending the public hear-
ing of the socio-economic and environmental effect of the programs.
Citizens then have the opportunity to criticize the proposed
project. This criticism gives the public officials a fuller apprecia-
tion of the adverse effects of a proposed transportation project
upon local residents. This public hearing provides the only forum
for direct citizen participation in transportation decisionmaking.
This participation is especially important because transportation
decisionmaking may well have more direct impact upon the lives of
residents than almost any other governmental action.
B. Relocation Assistance: Homes for the Homeless
When transportation projects pass through urban areas, homes
and businesses are usually demolished. In 1970 alone, federally
116. See generally J. MEYER, J. KAIN & M. WOHL, THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM
30-55 (1965).
117. 521 F.2d at 680-82.
118. 355 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
119. Id. at 28.
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aided highway construction displaced 62,000 residents from their
homes. 12 0 Unfortunately, it is often the poor whose homes are
taken. 2' With the increasing cost of adequate housing, these poor
displaced families are having the most difficulty relocating. 2 ' To
help relocate persons displaced by federal programs, Congress en-
acted the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act."3 This legislation
applies to both federal mass transit and highway programs. Persons
displaced by state or local government activities or by purely pri-
vate activity receive no coverage.2 4
Although the act generally applies to those displaced by federal
programs, not all applicants will qualify for federal assistance. For
example, to qualify for relocation assistance, applicants must be in
occupancy before highway officials and citizens commence negotia-
tions. People who move into apartments after the government has
paid for the apartment building are disqualified.' Furthermore,
unless affected residents can preliminarily enjoin highway construc-
tion, local officials may take these residents' homes before the cases
reach trial.
In Concerned Citizens For the Preservation of Clarksville v.
Volpe '2 the proposed Mo-Pac expressway was to pass through a
densely populated lower income area. Residents of the area sought
to enjoin the highway construction. However, all displaced residents
had accepted relocation by the time of trial. In finding the issue
moot, Judge Morgan stated that "any attempt at injunctive relief
would require this court to undo what has, by the working of time
and intervening events, escaped the power of the injunction.""12 As
120. HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 91st CONG., 2d Sess., ANNUAL REPORT ON HIGHWAY
RELOCATION ASSISTANCE 10 (1970).
121. Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REV. 745 (1971);
Note, In the Path of Progress: Federal Highway Relocation Assurances, 82 YALE L.J. 373, 379-
82 (1972); Note, Relocation: An Investigation into Relocation under the Federal-Aid Highway
Program, 7 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 466 (1971); FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HIGHWAYS 3-4 (1972). Forty-four
million dollars per year in federal payments are used to relocate families. Sixty percent of
this amount is spent on the Interstate System and forty percent on all other highway systems.
Id. at 3. For a more elaborate discussion of the effect of highways on the urban poor, see
Sevilla, supra note 4.
122. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
968 (1974); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Concerned Citizens for the
Preservation of Clarksville v. Volpe, 445 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1971); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp.
1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975);
Hanley v. Volpe, 305 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 4621 et seq. (1970).
124. Hartman, supra note 121, at 770.
125. Lewis v. Brinegar, 372 F. Supp. 424, 430 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
126. 445 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1971).
127. Id. at 491.
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the Clarksville case indicates, residents should initiate suit before
accepting relocation, and should seek an immediate halt to highway
construction.
Government officials may argue that applicants do not qualify
because highway construction has not reached the stage at which
the Uniform Relocation Act applies. The Ninth Circuit in Lathan
v. Volpe 2 ' examined the highway construction process in order to
determine the point at which applicants become eligible for assis-
tance. In that case, highway officials wanted to build an interstate
through a densely populated, low income area of downtown Seattle.
When the corridor for this highway was selected the market value
of the homes dropped. Although over 150 homes were then sold to
the state, no relocation assistance was provided for the displaced
families. The state argued that relocation assistance payments were
not required until the highway project had been finally approved,
irrespective of the fact that families had already been displaced by
the highway construction. The court concluded that federal assis-
tance must become operative at the corridor approval stage."9 This
holding appears sound since the purpose of the Uniform Relocation
Act is to provide assistance to displaced families.
The extent of federal assistance was considered in Keith v.
Volpe,"3 where the court defined the three basic requirements of the
relocation act. First, state authorities must provide fair and reason-
able relocation payments. Under this requirement, the state must
reimburse displaced families for moving expenses, either by reim-
bursement for the actual cost of moving, or by provision for a set
moving allowance,"' and the state must pay supplemental amounts
(up to $15,000) which cover the difference between the compensa-
tion that a homeowner receives from the state for an old home and
the purchase price for replacement housing. Second, the state must
provide a "relocation assistance program." Under this second re-
quirement, state officials must study the needs of displaced persons,
and also as provide current information on the availability and cost
of comparable housing. Third, the state must assure the Federal
Highway Administrator that adequate replacement housing will be
found within a reasonable time. This replacement housing must also
be located in areas which are as desirable as the area from which
the applicants are displaced.'32
128. 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971).
129. Id. at 1119.
130. 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
131. See Hartman, supra note 121, at 772-73.
132. 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1342-43 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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In Keith the court focused principally on the second require-
ment of the Uniform Relocation Act. Local officials formulated a
relocation assistance program which computed the number of
homes that could be used to replace dwellings destroyed during
highway construction. This number represented the homes which
were traditionally sold during a given year. However, the officials
did not consider that persons other than those displaced by highway
construction would be in the market for these dwellings. Finding the
studies inadequate, the court halted highway construction. 3 '
As is evident in the Keith opinion, courts will subject the activi-
ties of state officials to rigorous examination. The recommendations
and conclusions of official studies as well as the reasonableness of
the methodologies used to reach these conclusions will be consid-
ered. Local officials must provide relocation assistance to those dis-
placed at any time after corridor approval. This assistance entails
payment of moving expenses as well as replacement housing. Never-
theless, it is clear that the Uniform Relocation Act is at best a
palliative for the substantial disruption which results when a family
is displaced.'3'
C. Environmental Impact Statements: The Government as
Trustee of the Nation's Environment
The National Environmental Policy Act 3' is an attempt by
Congress to harmonize the relationship of man to his environment.
Under the provisions of this act, the federal government is consid-
ered a trustee of the nation's environment. In fulfilling this trust all
federal agencies must provide an environmental impact statement
which covers major federal actions significantly affecting the envi-
ronment. 3 ' Furthermore, federal officials must obtain comments
133. Id. at 1350.
134. Note, Relocation: An Investigation Into Relocation Under the Federal-Aid Highway
Program, 7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 466, 467 (1971).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970). For a general discussion of how NEPA has been
applied, see R. Lynch, Complying With NEPA: The Tortuous Path to an Adequate Environ-
mental Impact Statement, 14 ARIz. L. REV. 717-45 (1972). For a discussion of NEPA's applica-
tion to highways, see Aurbach, Environmental Policy and Urban Transportation (Urban
Freeway Manifesto Revisited), 4 URBAN LAW 713, 715-19 (1972); Comment, The Preparation
of Environmental Impact Statements by State Highway Commissions, 58 IowA L. REv. 1268
(1973).
136. Federally aided highway construction almost always constitutes a "major federal
action" within the meaning of NEPA. See, e.g., Fayetteville Area Chamber of Commerce v.
Volpe, 515 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1976); Citizens Environmen-
tal Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1973); Hopewell
Township Citizens 1-95 Comm. v. Volpe, 482 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1973); Monroe County Conser-
vation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972); Pennsylvana Environmental
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from any federal agency which has legal jurisdiction or which has
special knowledge regarding the environmental impact involved.
These comments must be circulated through the existing agency
review process and must be given careful consideration.'37
Federal highway officials are generally required to take an ac-
tive role in formulating an environmental impact statement for pro-
jects under federal supervision. In Conservation Society v. Secretary
of Transportation,'35 a draft of an environmental impact statement
was developed and written by state highway officials. Federal high-
way administrators did not conceive, write, or even edit the environ-
mental impact statement. The court held that the requirements of
NEPA had not been fulfilled.'39 Responding to the decision in the
Conservation Society case, Congress enacted an amendment to
NEPA.4'1 Pursuant to this amendment, an agency which has state-
wide jurisdiction can draft an environmental impact statement
without federal help.
Although federal officials may adequately participate in the
Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp.
1102 (D. Hawaii 1974); City of Rye v. Schuler, 355 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Indian
Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972), modified, 484 F.2d 11 (8th
Cir. 1973).
137. Stop H-3 Assn'n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (D. Hawaii 1974).
138. 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), affd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated, 423 U.S.
809 (1975).
139. Id. at 632-36. See also Fayetteville Area Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe, 515 F.2d
1021 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1976) (federal involvement held sufficient
where both federal and state officials participated in the drafting of an environmental impact
statement).
140. The amendment provides that an environmental impact statement shall not be
deemed to be legally insufficient solely by reason of having been prepared by a state agency
or official if:
(i) the State agency or official has statewide jurisdiction and has the responsibil-
ity for such action,
(ii) the responsible Federal official furnishes guidance and participates in such
preparation,
(iii) the responsible Federal official independently evaluates such statement prior
to its approval and adoption, and
(iv) after January 1, 1976, the responsible Federal official provides early notifica-
tion to, and solicits the view of, any other State or any Federal land management
entity of any action or any alternative thereto which may have significant impacts
upon such State or affected Federal land management entity and, if there is any
disagreement on such impacts, prepares a written assessment of such impacts and
views for incorporation into such detailed statement.
The procedures in this subparagraph shall not relieve the Federal official of
his responsibilities for the scope, objectivity, and content of the entire statement
or of any other responsibility under this chapter; and further, this subparagraph
does not affect the legal sufficiency of statements prepared by State agencies with
less than statewide jurisdiction.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (Supp. V, 1975).
[Vol. 31:353
TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
drafting of an environmental impact statement, judges may still
look suspiciously at statements which cover only small segments of
a highway project. Such judicial suspicion was aroused in the case
of Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 4' where an interstate highway
affected the historical Indian Lookout Bluff area near Iowa City,
Iowa. Since the southern section of the highway project was ap-
proved prior to the enactment of NEPA, transportation officials
argued that only the northern section required an environmental
impact statement. The state highway department proposed to build
the southern section up to an interchange near the lookout area.
Since the southern section would affect this historic area, the court
required an environmental impact statement for both the northern
and southern sections.' Similarly, in Conservation Society of
Southern Vermont v. Secretary of Transportation'4 3 the court de-
creed that the provisions of NEPA required an environmental im-
pact statement for the entire highway, rather than for each individ-
ual segment.'
Accordingly, courts should scrutinize environmental impact
statements which are drafted for small highway segments. Although
the adverse environmental impact of an individual highway seg-
ment may not be significant, the cumulative impact of all the seg-
ments may be. Alternatively, the environmental impact of a partic-
ular segment may be extremely harmful while the impact of other
segments may not be. If highway officials can draft statements for
these environmentally harmless segments and are allowed to build
over these segments, construction through the environmentally de-
structive segment may later become a practical necessity. There
are, however, limits to requiring an environmental impact state-
ment for an entire highway. In this regard, the court in Movement
Against Destruction v. Volpe' explained that denying segmenta-
tion could be taken to extremes. Thus, requiring an environmental
impact statement for an entire urban transportation system would
be impractical. The court cautioned that the environmental impact
statement of particular segments should, however, be considered in
relation to the environmental impact of other segments. In addition,
the court stated that both a segmented and a regional environmen-
tal impact statement could be required in certain instances.'
141. 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972), modified, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973).
142. Id. at 1172.
143. 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated, 423 U.S.
809 (1975).
144. Id. at 636-38.
145. 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974).
146. Id. at 1385.
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Before federal officials draft an environmental impact state-
ment for an appropriate area of a transportation project, they
should determine what the environmental impact statement must
contain. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC"4 7
Judge Skelly Wright posited that the environmental impact state-
ment should contain a particularly close analysis which balanced
economic and technical considerations against environmental
amenities.' 8 The statement might conclude that the environmental
costs outweigh economic and technical benefits, or conversely, that
the economic benefits outweigh the environmental costs.
In enumerating the elements of an environmental impact state-
ment, Congress has prescribed a detailed analysis of five factors:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternative to the proposed
action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be involved in the pro-
posed action should it be implemented. " '
Although requiring a detailed analysis, the statute does not
illustrate the extent of the detail required. Certainly a point can be
reached where the cost of environmental study becomes prohibitive.
In a practical context, the courts have generally required only a good
faith effort at compliance with NEPA. For example, in Stop H-3
Association v. Brinegarl50 the environmental impact statement con-
tained a discussion of each of the elements outlined under NEPA.
Although plaintiff's expert testified that the cost-benefit analysis
was deficient, the expert further testified that he had never seen an
adequate cost-benefit analysis of a transportation project. The court
concluded that the environmental impact statement had met the
requirements of NEPA.5 '
On the other hand, courts have not allowed highway officials
to ignore the provisions of NEPA or draft environmental impact
statements in a conclusory, rather than a detailed, way. In finding
that the highway officials had not complied with NEPA, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington in Daly
147. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
148. Id. at 1113.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C) (1970).
150. 389 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Hawaii 1974).
151. Id. at 1113.
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v. Volpe' examined the section of the environmental impact state-
ment which covered the irretrievable commitments of federal re-
sources. The court explained that this section should list the cost
of land, construction materials, labor and other measurable costs
which cannot be returned once a highway is constructed."53
As is evident in the Daly court's reasoning, the environmental
impact statement should provide specific details of the projected
dollar costs of highway construction; yet, the court did not address
the detail required in determining the environmental effects of high-
way construction. In Brooks v. Volpe"4 the plaintiffs sought to pre-
vent construction of an interstate highway which would pass
through the Cascade Mountains of Washington. The impact state-
ment suggested that "[j]ust as the old wagon road over Snoqualine
Pass was retrieved by nature in less than 100 years, so would this
(highway) project revert back to nature in time."'' 5 Furthermore,
the impact statement's analysis of highway noise was minimal be-
cause the "rural character of the area renders it nearly free of per-
manent nearby human habitation."'' 6 The court did not appreciate
the highway-wagon trail analogy. Maintaining that the
requirements of NEPA must be complied with to the fullest extent
possible, the court ordered each agency to undertake the research
necessary to make the impact statement detailed and precise.' 7
As demonstrated in the H-3 Daly and Brooks cases, NEPA is
an effective way of compelling transportation officials to consider
the environmental effects of transportation projects. Highways can-
not be segmented in order to avoid the requirements of NEPA, the
environmental impact study must be detailed and precise, and fed-
eral highway officials must make a good faith effort to comply with
NEPA's provisions. As a result, NEPA is now an important factor
in transportation decisionmaking.
D. Section 4(f): The Vital Need for Open Space
Rather than pay the high costs of urban land, transportation
152. 350 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash. 1972), injunction dissolved, 376 F. Supp. 987 (1974),
dissdlution aff'd, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975).
153. Id. at 259.
154. 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1973), injunction
dissolved, 380 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
155. Id. at 278.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 275-79. It should be noted that although in both Daly and Brooks the injunc-
tions, originally issued against the agency for insufficient impact statements, were eventually
dissolved, the principle that the EIS must be detailed and precise remains intact. The disso-
lution of the injunctions merely indicated that the impact statements in question were held
to be sufficiently detailed.
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officials often choose routes through publicly owned parklands.115
Congress enacted section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation
Act' 9 in order to protect parkland and other open spaces. Since both
the Federal Highway Administration and the Urban Mass Transit
Administration are part of the Department of Transportation, sec-
tion 4(f) applies to both highway and mass transit construction. ""
Section 4(f) prohibits the Secretary from approving any project
which uses land in a "public park, recreational area, or wildlife and
waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance," or uses
land from an historic site unless "there is no feasible and prudent
alternative . . . and" unless "such program includes all possible
planning to minimize harm to such" areas."' Where the government
begins participation in the construction of a highway project, but
has not granted federal funds, highway officials have contended that
section 4(f) does not apply. In Named Individual Members of San
Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department, "I the
Fifth Circuit examined this issue, as well as an issue concerning
highway segmentation. The conservation society sought to enjoin
the construction of an interstate highway which would take about
200 acres of parklands. The Secretary of Transportation approved
two highway segments which led up to the park from both direc-
tions, but did not approve the section through the park itself. High-
way officials argued that no 4(f) finding was needed even though, if
these end segments were completed, the route through the park
would be assured. The court decided that such segmentation was
unauthorized under 4(f), and that in approving the segments the
Secretary had exceeded the scope of his authority."'6 The San
Antonio case illustrates the type of skeptical analysis undertaken
when judicial suspicions are aroused.
Perhaps the best known case delineating the scope of this anal-
ysis is Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion in Citizens to Preserve Over-
158. See, e.g., Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1972); Hearings on Urban Highway Planning, Location and Design Before the Subcomm. on
Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1 & 2 at 405-06
(1968) (illustration of comparative costs).
159. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
160. For an analysis of the requirements of 4(f), see Gray, Section 4(f) of the Department
of Transportation Act, 32 MD. L. REv. 327 (1972); Note, Favoring Parks Over Highways - A
First Step Toward Resolving the Conflict Between Preservation of Environmental Amenities
and Expansion of the Highway System, 57 IOWA L. REv. 834 (1971).
161. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
162. 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
163. Id. at 1020; River v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.),
a/'d, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973); Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. "I Overton Park comprised 342 acres near
the center of Memphis, Tennessee. The park contained a zoo, a
municipal golf course, picnic areas, and 170 acres of forest. The
proposed six-lane highway would have severed the zoo from the rest
of the park. Although highway officials maintained that the costs
of other routes and safety considerations should be balanced equally
against the harm to the parkland, Mr. Justice Marshall disagreed.
"The few green havens that are public parks" should not be lost
except in truly unusual circumstances or when there were disrup-
tions of extraordinary magnitudes."'
Although the Overton Park opinion clarified the meaning of
section 4(f), other courts have made more specific interpretations of
particular phrases within the section. For instance, the phrase "no
feasible alternative" has been construed to mean that no other alter-
native route was practicable as a matter of sound engineering., "
Additionally, the meaning of the phrase "national, state, or local
significance" was considered in Arlington Coalition on Transporta-
tion v. Volpe,' 7 where appellees argued that the park was insignifi-
cant. The court concluded that all parks were significant for pur-
poses of 4(f) unless explicitly determined otherwise.'
The Arlington decision did not explain the weight which should
be given to a local official's determination of significance. This was
the scope of inquiry in Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the
Environment v. Volpe,1' where a proposed interstate highway
would have taken 27 acres of the 850 acre Wildwood Park. Even
though officials declared that the park was insignificant, the
Harrisburg court decreed that the Secretary of Transportation must
make an independent finding of significance. 1 " The holding in
Harrisburg was, of course, a practical necessity. If local officials
could avoid the application of section 4(f) by declaring a park insig-
nificant, much of section 4(f)'s effect would be destroyed.
Beginning initially with the Overton Park decision, judges have
struggled over the meaning of section 4(f). Since citizens have often
sought to block highways which pass through public parks, cases
have developed which illustrate the meaning of such words as "fea-
164. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
165. Id. at 412-13.
166. Id. at 411; Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d
Cir. 1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1344 (9th
Cir. 1973).
167. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
168. Id. at 1336.
169. 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
170. Id. at 929.
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sible alternatives" and "significant parkland." Throughout these
cases, the courts have attempted to further the Congressional intent
of assigning paramount importance to the preservation of parkland.
Considering that each mile of freeway devours roughly 30 acres of
land, the potential loss of parkland caused by transportation con-
struction is high,'7' and the judicial efforts are certainly justified.
E. State Action Plans: Streamlining the Highway Decisionmaking
Process
Transportation officials have not always complied with federal
requirements. In part this lack of compliance may be caused by the
confusion which results when officials attempt to fulfill so many
federal conditions. In the 1970 Highway Act, Congress included pro-
visions which helped to alleviate this confusion.'72 Under this act,
guidelines were promulgated which attempted to assure that all
adverse economic, social, and environmental effects of highway
building would be considered.'73 These guidelines apply to federal
highway building only; mass transit construction is not covered. 74
However, state highway departments have often included mass
transit procedures in state proposals.'75
The guidelines compel each state highway department to de-
velop an action plan which describes the procedures for the develop-
ment of federal highways from the planning stage through the de-
sign stage.' Federal funds will not be allocated unless states have
adopted an action plan which is approved by the Federal Highway
Administration. " The federal highway procedures require agencies
to develop organizational structures that have the capability of uti-
lizing the disciplines of the biological, social, physical, and human
171. Note, A Cure for the Highway Epidemic: A Balanced Subsidy, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
902, 904 (1971). See also H. LEAVIrT, supra note 22.
One of the most far-sighted little books written on the subject of how highways would
affect the city was written by Lewis Mumford, in which he stated:
Perhaps our age will be known to the future historian as the age of the bulldozer
and the exterminator; and in many parts of the country the building of a highway
has about the same result upon vegetation and human structures as the passage
of a tornado or a blast of an atom bomb.
L. MUMFORD, THE HIGHWAY AND THE CITY 237 (1963).
172. 23 U.S.C. § 109(h) (1970).
173. Federal Highway Administration, United States Department of Transportation,
Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90.4 (1973).
174. See 23 U.S.C. § 109(h) (1970).
175. See, e.g., State of Wisconsin, Department of Transportation, Action Plan For
Transportation Development IV - 1-3 (1974).
176. See Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90.4 § 6(a), supra note 173, at 99.
177. Id. § 6(g), at 100.
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relations sciences, as well as the engineering sciences.' 71 The action
plan outlines the procedures for complying with federal conditions.
Thus, the plan should identify potential social, economic, and envi-
ronmental effects of alternative courses of action'79 including the
development of no highway at all. Additionally, the action plan
should identify those persons responsible for ensuring that informa-
tion is made available to the public and that interested parties,
including local governments and state and federal agencies, have
the opportunity to participate in an open exchange of views."' 4
Therefore, the action plan helps to ensure that the public hearing
condition is met.
Besides helping to fulfill the public hearing condition, the ac-
tion plan must provide for an interdisciplinary analysis which will
satisfy the provisions of NEPA. The action plan should develop
methods to meet the requirements of NEPA, including the
development of an interdisciplinary team" ' and should also arrange
for the consideration of modes of transportation other than high-
ways.' 2 Since the 3c process condition requires inter-modal analy-
sis, the action plan also helps to satisfy the 3c process condition. In
addition, the action plan must ensure that replacement housing is
developed in coordination with transportation improvements.,'
Thus, the action plan contributes to meeting the provisions of the
Uniform Relocation Act.
States have developed differing approaches to fulfilling the
guidelines of the Federal Highway Administration. Of 40 state ac-
tion plans, which were included in a recent study, 17 were organized
under a Department of Transportation, while 23 were organized
under the state highway departments. Most of the states have in-
cluded an interdisciplinary unit which will analyze the environmen-
tal impacts of transportation proposals. States with large metropoli-
tan areas place more emphasis on the need to consider a balance of
transportation modes.' 4 Despite these differences, the action plan
will help highway officials to plan for and comply with federal provi-
sions.
178. AMos, JOSEY & CARRAL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE HIGHWAY ORGANIZATION'S ACTION
PLANS FOR THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 4 (1975).
179. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90.4 § 10(a), supra note 173, at 101.
180. Id. §§ 10(b)(1) - 11 (b)(3), at 101.
181. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90.4 § 10(a), supra note 173 at 101.
182. Id. § 10(b)(3), at 101.
183. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90.4 § 10(b)(4), supra note 173, at 101.
184. See AMOS, et al., supra note 178, at 8-10 (1975).
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V. How FEDERAL PROVISIONS HAVE ALTERED TRANSPORTATION
DECISIONMAKING
The federal government has spent billions of dollars on trans-
portation construction. Recently, citizens have been successful in
halting this construction by asserting that federal conditions were
not met.' 5 By forcing highway officials to comply with federal man-
dates, citizen suits have contributed to changing the transportation
decisionmaking process.
Fifteen years ago the transportation planning process was nar-
rower. Transportation planning was often limited to sophisticated
techniques of forecasting transportation needs. ' It was generally
acknowledged that the benefits of efficient transportation out-
weighed the incidental harms which resulted from highway con-
struction. Thus, the effects of transportation improvements on the
environment, on open spaces, and on residents' homes and busi-
nesses were not fully considered.' 7
As noted earlier, during the late sixties, Americans became
more sensitive to societal problems. 8S To protect the environment,
Congress enacted NEPA under which federal transportation offi-
cials must participate in the research and preparation of environ-
mental impact statements.' 8 In addition, the Department of Trans-
portation Act compels special efforts to be taken to preserve the
natural beauty of the countryside, public parks, recreational areas,
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites."' The enforcement
of these funding conditions has helped to move transportation
decisionmaking towards a fuller appreciation of the adverse envi-
ronmental effects of transportation projects.
To protect the rights of minority groups, Congress enacted the
Uniform Relocation Assistance Act"' compelling transportation of-
ficials to make special provisions for people displaced by transporta-
tion improvements. To provide local residents with a forum for pro-
test, Congress passed public hearing provisions. ' Under these
185. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 130-33 supra.
186. Altshuler, A Decade of Change in Urban Transportation Planning, Paper Presented
at Harvard Graduate School of Design's Annual Conference on the Professions 32 (1974).
187. Id. at 27-29. Altshuler suggests that transportation planning in the 1950's was a
product of the time. The planning process reflected less concern for environmental harm or
for the needs of minority groups.
188. Id.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
190. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (Supp. IV, 1974). 49 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides
for similar efforts with respect to mass transportation.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 4621 et seq. (1970).
192. 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970) (highways); 49 U.S.C. § 1602(d) (1970) (mass transit).
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provisions transportation officials must properly notify affected
citizens of impending public hearings. The result of these federal
provisions has been to contribute to making transportation de-
cisionmaking a more participatory process.
Federal provisions have also contributed to a movement from
a regional to a more local transportation analysis.'93 In the tradi-
tional transportation planning process, present and potential loca-
tions of population and industry were used to determine appropriate
transportation routes.' Recent federal conditions, prompted by
neighborhood reaction, add a more localized emphasis to this re-
gional approach.'95 In this regard the studies required by the Uni-
form Relocation Act often are local in scope.'96 Many of the adverse
environmental effects which must be detailed in an environmental
impact statement are also primarily local.
Over the past few years transportation planners also have
moved from a pro-highway bias to a more balanced blend of high-
ways and mass transit. This movement is partly due to a change in
federal funding policy. During the 1950's and 1960's Congress appro-
priated billions of dollars for highways and relatively little for mass
transit. Thus, federal highway expenditures in urban areas between
1961 and 1970 amounted to 21.3 billion dollars. During the same
time period mass transit funding represented only 684 million dol-
lars, or 1/31 of the highway expenditure.'97 This one-sided funding
distorted transportation planning by denying modal choice.' When
transportation decisionmakers reached the point of choosing
whether to build highways or mass transit facilities, these decision-
makers were forced to build highways, even though the most sensi-
193. See Altshuler, supra note 186, at 29-30.
194. J. DESALVIO, PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 348-50 (1973).
195. Altshuler, supra note 186, at 33-34.
196. See text accompanying notes 130-32 supra. These studies analyze the number of
local residents displaced by the transportation improvement. In addition, the Relocation Act
requires that existing replacement housing be built or located. See also Keith v. Volpe, 352
F. Supp. 1324, 1342-43 (C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 908 (1975).
197. Altshuler, supra note 186, at 34-35.
198. In commenting about the highway expenditures authorized under the 1956 Highway
Acts, Lewis Mumford stated:
When the American people, through their Congress, voted a little while ago (1957)
for a twenty-six-billion-dollar highway program, the most charitable thing to
assume about this action is that they hadn't the faintest notion of what they were
doing. Within the next fifteen years they will doubtless find out; but by that time
it will be too late to correct all the damage to our cities and our countryside, not
least to the efficient organization of industry and transportation, that this ill-
conceived and preposterously unbalanced program will have wrought.
L. MUMFORD, THE HIGHWAY AND THE CITY 234 (1963).
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ble solution to a particular transportation problem might have been
a subway system, or a combination of mass transit and highways.'
1
This highway-oriented federal policy had profound effects on
our urban transportation network. The availability of highways has
promoted the use of automobiles rather than other forms of trans-
portation.2 Automobiles and trucks now dominate urban transpor-
tation. Between 1960 and 1970 automobile travel in urban areas
increased 73.6 percent, and truck travel increased 80.4 percent.2 "
During this same period, surface railway travel decreased 54.7 per-
cent, trolley coach travel decreased 67.3 percent, and bus travel
decreased 10.6 percent.22 This predominance of automobile travel
causes serious modern problems. Highways have become congested
with traffic, particularly during rush hours. Automobiles emit car-
bon dioxide and particulate matter as well as other polluting sub-
stances. Furthermore, automobile transportation is extremely fuel-
consumptive. 03
199. Salaman, Towards Balanced Urban Transportation: Reform of the State Highway
Trust Funds, 4 URBAN LAW 77, 82 (1972). In commenting on the distortion which this single
modal emphasis had, H. Leavitt stated:
[Tlhe Interstate System has in effect forced our society to scuttle all forms of
transportation except the automobile ....
[H]ighway boosters had decided to make the private automobile the dominant
form of urban transportation, and overemphasis on superhighways, particularly
Interstate and primary highways, and lack of attention to public transportation
left the public with no choice except to drive cars.
H. LEAVITT, supra note 22, at 4-8. Our highway program has, in effect, made it possible for
every automobile owner to have his own private tranportation system. Id. See also TAX
FOUNDATION, URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION IN PERSPECTIVE 8 (1968).
200. See Sevilla, supra note 4, at 303.
201. See id. at 297, 302 (1971).
202. See Transportation Report, supra note 19, at 78. Vehicle miles in passenger cars
increased from 284,800 million in 1960 to 494,543 million in 1970, while vehicle miles for
trucks went from 44,687 million to 80,606 million. Id. Total trucking freight expenditure was
40,358.8 million dollars in 1970. Id. at 81. The 1956 Highway Acts assured that metropolitan
as well as intercity transportation would be automobile and truck dominated. See MERTINS,
supra note 1, at 61. In 1970, intercity passenger travel by car represented 1,026 billion miles,
an increase of 49.8 percent since 1958; while bus, rail and air travel came to 151.8 billion.
While intercity freight movement by rail in ton miles has decreased from 54 to 35.9 percent
of the total from 1947 to 1970, trucking has increased from 5.2 to 15.9 percent of the total.
See Transportation Report, supra note 19, at 75, Tables 111-6, 111-9.
203. By building a vast system of highways, the federal government has sponsored the
dominance of the more fuel-consumptive automobile in urban areas. The implications of
automobile domination become clearer when it is realized that a 0.52 percent energy savings
will result from a 20 billion passenger mile shift from urban automobile to mass transit, about
1 percent of 1970 passenger traffic. Although there are energy savings inherent in a shift from
automobiles to mass transit, such a shift may be difficult to achieve. One of the effects of
the predominance of automobile use is to instill reliance on automobiles. The life styles of
millions of Americans include automobile use. Compared to mass transit, the advantages of
automobiles are numerous. An automobile driver can go directly from home to office or store
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Although transportation planners appreciated the adverse ef-
fects of automobile use, there were few funds for mass transit con-
struction until 1974. The 1974 Urban Mass Transit Assistance Act
provided 10.9 billion federal dollars for mass transit facilities over
a 6-year period. This appropriation made mass transit construction
a more viable alternative to highway building. It should contribute
to a change in transportation decisionmaking. As a result, transpor-
tation planners should continue to move from a pro-highway bias
to a more balanced blend of highways and mass transit.210
The courts have also aided this change in transportation deci-
sionmaking. Although the scope of substantive judicial review of
transportation agency action is generally limited, the courts have
encouraged a more balanced decisionmaking process by enforcing
procedural requirements. In this way courts have contributed to
shifting transportation decisionmaking from a scientific, regional
and single-modal approach to include a more participatory, local
and balanced approach,
This shift has brought many benefits. Homes are provided for
the homeless, local citizens have more participation in transporta-
tion decisions, there is more mass transit funding, and our environ-
mental resources are better protected. However, the burden of com-
pliance with these statutory requirements may have shifted trans-
portation decisionmaking too far from the basic concern of building
an efficient transportation network. The development of these
transportation networks is essential to our economy. Raw products
must be brought to the factory. Finished products must be trans-
ported to consumers. People must travel to and from work. In this
economic milieu court enforcement of federal requirements has
hindered the construction of these vital transportation networks.
This hindrance has been caused by many factors. The time and
effort required to comply with the federal provisions is enormous.
The citizen suits tax an already overburdened court system. Thus
transportation projects are sometimes delayed for months while the
trial progresses.
at any time and can move to industry locations not easily accessible by mass transit. See
Cooper, Prospects for a Mass Movement to Public Transit, 5 URBAN LAW 679, 679-83 (1973).
On the other hand, transit is limited by fixed, and sometimes infrequent, time schedules.
Transit riders must wait in inconvenient and unattractive public stations, and must often
walk long distances from stations to work. Id.; Note, The Municipal Quarantine: Restrictions
on Automobile Commutation Within the Urban Environs, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 942, 944-45
(1971).
204. See Engelen & Stuart, New Directions in Urban Transportation Planning, PLANNING
ADVISOaY SERVICE, Rept. No. 303, 3 (1974).
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Commentators have suggested alternatives to ease these
burdens. For instance, special administrative and judicial proce-
dures might be established to speed the adjudicative process.
Alternatively, Congress could clarify the weight to be given various
factors in this balance. However, such clarification is difficult. It is
questionable whether Congress can draft standards which avoid
rather than stimulate litigation.205 There are no easy solutions.
Transportation decisionmaking is fraught with value judgments. To
a certain extent, this article is meant to challenge others to study
transportation decisionmaking in order to devise means of reducing
the burdens while still preserving the benefits that have resulted
from the shift in the focus of transportation decisionmaking.
205. Altshuler & Curry, The Changing Environment of Urban Development Policy -
Shared Power or Shared Impotence? 10 URBAN LAW ANNUAL 3, 13 (1975).
